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Abstract— We consider the signal-anticipating behavior in local
Volt/Var control for distribution systems. Such a behavior makes
interaction among the nodes a game. We characterize Nash
equilibrium of the game as the optimum of a global optimization
problem and establish its asymptotic global stability. We also
show that the signal-anticipating voltage control has less restric-
tive convergence condition than the signal-taking control. We
then introduce the notion of Price of Signal-Anticipation (PoSA)
to characterize the impact of signal-anticipating control, and use
the gap in cost between network equilibrium in the signal-taking
control and Nash equilibrium in the signal-anticipating control as
the metric for PoSA. We characterize how the PoSA scales with
the size, topology, and heterogeneity of the distribution network
for a few network settings. Our results show that the PoSA is
upper bounded by a constant and the average PoSA per node will
go to zero as the size of the network increases. This is desirable
as it means that the PoSA will not be arbitrarily large, no matter
what the size of the network is, and no mechanism is needed to
mitigate the signal-anticipating behavior. We further carry out
numerical experiments with a real-world distribution circuit to
complement the theoretical analysis.
Index Terms— Signal-anticipating, efficiency loss, voltage con-
trol game, distributed control, voltage regulation, power net-
works.
I. Introduction
Motivated by the proposed IEEE 1547.8 standard [2], we
have studied in [3], [4] a class of inverter-based local Volt/Var
control schemes in distribution systems that set the reactive
power at the output of an inverter based only on the local volt-
age deviation from its nominal value at a node/bus. We have
shown that the resulting dynamical system with such local
voltage control has a unique equilibrium point, characterized
it as the unique optimum of a well-defined global optimization
problem, and established its global stability. See Section II for
a brief review of the related results.
These Volt/Var control schemes take the feedback signal,
i.e., the voltage, as given, and therefore the nodes/buses can
be seen as being signal-taking. However, a node may be
able to learn or infer the impact of its own decision on the
feedback signal, and take it into consideration when making
the control decision on reactive power, which we call the
signal-anticipating voltage control. In this paper, we study
such a signal-anticipating behavior. Specifically, the signal-
anticipating control makes the interaction among the nodes
a game, which we call the voltage control game. We show
that the signal-anticipating voltage control is the best response
algorithm of the voltage control game, and its fixed point is
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the Nash equilibrium of the voltage control game and vice
versa. We further show that the voltage control game has a
unique Nash equilibrium, characterize it as the optimum of
a global optimization problem, and establish its asymptotic
global stability under the signal-anticipating voltage control.
We also show that the signal-anticipating voltage control has
less restrictive convergence condition than the signal-taking
control.
The signal-taking and signal-anticipating behaviors in local
voltage control are analogous to the price-taking and price-
anticipating behaviors in economics [5], [6]. It is well-known
that in a competitive market with price-taking customers the
system achieves an efficient equilibrium and in an oligopolistic
market with price-anticipating customers the system usually
incurs efficiency loss. Similarly, we consider that the signal-
taking behavior leads to an efficient equilibrium while the
signal-anticipating behavior may result in efficiency loss.
Specifically, we introduce the notion of the price of signal-
anticipation (PoSA) to characterize the impact of the signal-
anticipation in local voltage control in particular and in dis-
tributed control in general. We use the gap in cost between the
network equilibrium in the signal-taking voltage control and
the Nash equilibrium in the signal-anticipating voltage control
as the metric for PoSA, and characterize how it scales with the
size, topology, and heterogeneity of the distribution network.
In particular, we give an upper bound on the PoSA, and
show that it is bounded by a constant that is independent
of the size of the network. We also show numerically that
the upper bound is very tight for the linear networks and
randomly generated tree networks when the size of the net-
work is large. Further, for the linear networks, we give a
refined characterization of the upper bound. This refinement
is based on an analytical form for the inverse of the reactance
matrix (or voltage to reactive power sensitivity matrix) we
discover.1 We then carry out numerical experiments with a 42-
bus distribution feeder of Southern California Edison (SCE) to
examine the efficiency loss as well as the convergence of the
signal-anticipating voltage control. All the numerical results
confirm the afore-mentioned theoretical analysis.
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to study the signal-
anticipating behavior and introduce the notion of the price
of signal-anticipation. The signal-anticipating behavior arises
in the setting of distributed control, where network nodes
or users have only limited and partial information about the
network due to various practical constraints and expect to
make the best use of the information in order to, e.g., improve
the stability of the system or optimize individual objectives.
For example, one motivation for the signal-anticipating local
1Although it is not directly relevant to the goals of this work, the discovery
of the analytical form for the inverse of the reactance matrix is itself a notable
contribution; see the Appendix. In [4] we use it to understand the structural
properties of the local voltage control in distribution systems.
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voltage control is that adapting to the expected voltage rather
than the current voltage may result in better convergence
property, as confirmed by Theorem 5. Besides this engineering
perspective, there is a complementary economic perspective:
The signal-anticipating behavior arises from the network nodes
or users being self-interested and strategic, the same way as the
price-anticipating behavior arising in an oligopolistic market.
In this paper, we take more of an engineering perspective, even
though we use an individual objective function to guide a node
in taking into consideration the impact of its own decision (see
Equation (8)).
An understanding and characterization of the signal-
anticipating behavior will be insightful in designing mecha-
nisms to mitigate its impact if it is not desired. Regarding
the signal-anticipating behavior in local voltage control in
distribution systems, our results show that the PoSA is upper
bounded by a constant, independent of the size of the network,
and the “average” PoSA per node will go to zero as the size
of the network increases. This is desirable as it means that the
PoSA will not be arbitrarily large, no matter what the size of
the network is, and no mechanism is needed to mitigate the
signal-anticipating behavior.
Related work: Voltage control is a research area with a
huge literature. Traditional approach to voltage control in
distribution systems is via capacitor banks and under load tap
changers; see, e.g., [7]–[9]. The new inverter-based approach
that can control reactive power much faster and in a much
finer granularity has been proposed and studied in, e.g., [10]–
[13] with local control, [14]–[18] with distributed control,
and [19]–[21] with centralized control. The local voltage
control based on real-time voltage measurement has also been
proposed for transmission systems; see, e.g., [22].
The price-anticipating behavior has been studied for engi-
neering systems too; see, e.g., [23], [24] for network resource
allocation and [25]–[28] for demand management in smart
grids. More generally, efficiency loss arising from strategic
or self-interested behaviors has ben studied using different
metrics such as the price of anarchy [6] for various systems
including power systems and communication networks; see,
e.g., [27], [29]–[35], to just name a few.
A comparison with our preliminary work [1] is in place.
This paper has significantly extended and improved upon [1] as
follows. First, the current proof of convergence of the signal-
anticipating voltage control uses the Contraction Mapping
Theorem instead of the Lyapunov Stability Theorem, and can
handle a more general problem setting with non-smooth cost
functions. Further, we have also showed that the convergence
condition for the signal-anticipating voltage control is less
restrictive than that of the signal-taking control. Second, in
[1] the analytical characterization of PoSA is very simple
and for the extreme cases with very large provisional cost or
very large voltage deviation cost, and the numerical examples
are for the simple two-link network and linear network with
all power lines having the same reactance. In contrast, our
current analytical characterization of PoSA is much more
complicated and thorough: 1) derive an upper bound on PoSA
for arbitrary tree networks and investigate its tightness in view
of a lower bound, and 2) derive a refined and closed form for
the upper bound for general linear networks with arbitrary line
reactances. Third, in addition to many numerical examples that
are used to complement the analytical results, in this paper we
have also carried out numerical experiments with a real-world
distribution feeder.
TABLE I: Notations
N Set of nodes, excluding node 0, indexed as {1,2,· · · , n}
L Set of all links representing power lines
Li Set of links on the path from node 0 to node i
pci , p
g
i Real power consumption and generation at node i
qci , q
g
i Reactive power consumption and generation at node i
ri j, xi j Resistance and reactance of line (i, j)
Pi j,Qi j Real and reactive power flows from i to j
vi Magnitude of complex voltage at node i
`i j Squared magnitude of complex current on (i, j)
L Weighted Laplacian matrix of undirected graph
λ, λmax, λmin Any, maximum, minimum eigenvalues of matrix
σmax Maximum singular value of matrix
II. Network Model and Signal-Taking Voltage Control
Consider a tree graph T = {N ∪ {0},L} that represents a
radial distribution network consisting of n + 1 nodes and a
set L of lines between these nodes. Node 0 is the substation
node and assumed to have a fixed voltage. For each node
i ∈ N , denote by Li ⊆ L the set of lines on the unique path
from node 0 to node i, pci and p
g
i the real power consumption
and generation, and qci and q
g
i the reactive power consumption
and generation, respectively. Let vi be the magnitude of the
complex voltage at node i. For each line (i, j) ∈ L, denote by
ri j and xi j its resistance and reactance, and Pi j and Qi j the
real and reactive power from node i to node j, respectively.
Let `i j denote the squared magnitude of the complex branch
current from node i to node j. These notations are summarized
in Table I. A quantity without subscript is usually a vector
with appropriate components defined earlier; e.g., v := [vi, i ∈
N]>, qg := [qgi , i ∈ N]>.
A. Linearized Branch Flow Model
We adopt the following branch flow model introduced in
[7], [8] to model a radial distribution system:
Pi j = pcj − pgj +
∑
k:( j,k)∈L
P jk + ri j`i j, (1a)
Qi j = qcj − qgj +
∑
k:( j,k)∈L
Q jk + xi j`i j, (1b)
v2j = v
2
i − 2
(
ri jPi j + xi jQi j
)
+
(
r2i j + x
2
i j
)
`i j, (1c)
`i jv2i = P
2
i j + Q
2
i j. (1d)
Following [36], we have introduced in [3], [4] a resistance
matrix R = [Ri j]n×n with Ri j :=
∑
(h,k)∈Li∩L j rhk and a reactance
matrix X = [Xi j]n×n with Xi j :=
∑
(h,k)∈Li∩L j xhk (see illustration
in Fig. 1), and derived from (1) a linearized branch flow model:
v = v0 + R(pg − pc) + X(qg − qc),
where v0 = [v0, . . . , v0]> is an n-dimensional vector. We as-
sume that v0, pc, pg, qc are given constants, and voltage magni-
tudes v := [v1, . . . , vn]> and reactive powers qg := [q
g
1, . . . , q
g
n]>
2
Fig. 1: Li∩L j for two nodes i, j and the corresponding mutual
voltage-to-power-injection sensitivity factors Ri j and Xi j.
are the only variables. Let v˜ = v0 +R(pg− pc)−Xqc, a constant
vector. For notational simplicity, in the rest of the paper we
will ignore the superscript in qg and write q instead. Then the
linearized branch flow model reduces to the following:
v = Xq + v˜. (2)
We have shown in [3], [4] that X is positive definite.
B. The Signal-Taking Volt/Var Control
The goal of Volt/Var control on a distribution network is to
provision reactive power injections q := [q1, . . . , qn]> in order
to maintain the node voltages v := [v1, . . . , vn]> to within a
tight range around their nominal values vnomi , i ∈ N . In [3],
[4], we have considered one type of local Volt/Var controls
where each node i makes an individual decision qi(t+1) based
only on its own voltage vi(t):
qi(t + 1) =
[
fi(vi(t) − vnomi )
]
Ωi
, ∀i ∈ N , (3)
where fi : R → R, Ωi =
{
qi | qimin ≤ qi ≤ qimax
}
the set of
feasible reactive power injections at node i, and [ ]Ωi denotes
the projection onto the set Ωi. This leads to the following
feedback dynamical system for the distribution network:
v(t) = Xq(t) + v˜, (4a)
q(t + 1) =
[
f (v(t) − vnom)]Ω , (4b)
where f : Rn → Rn denotes the collection of [ fi, i ∈ N]>, with
Ω = ×i∈NΩi. A fixed point of the above dynamical system
represents an equilibrium operating point of the network.
Definition 1 (Definition 2 in [3], [4]) (v∗, q∗) is called an
equilibrium point, or a network equilibrium, if it is a fixed
point of (4a)–(4b), i.e.,
v∗ = Xq∗ + v˜,
q∗ =
[
f (v∗ − vnom)]Ω .
Consider that for each node i ∈ N there is a symmetric
deadband [−δi/2, δi/2] around the origin with δi ≥ 0 in the
control function fi, i.e., fi(ui) = 0 for ui ∈ [−δi/2, δi/2]. We
make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 The local Volt/Var control functions fi are
nonincreasing over R, strictly decreasing, and differentiable
in (−∞,−δi/2) ∪ (δi/2,∞).
Assumption 2 The derivative of each control function fi is
bounded, i.e., there exists a finite αi such that | f ′i (ui)| ≤ αi for
all ui in the appropriate domain, for all i ∈ N .
Define a cost function for each node i ∈ N :
Ci(qi) := −
∫ qi
0
f −1i (q) dq.
Function fi is decreasing by Assumption 1, so is its inverse
f −1i . Therefore, Ci is convex by the second order condition of
convex functions. Given any vi(t), qi(t+1) in (4b) is the unique
solution to an individual decision problem of node i ∈ N :
qi(t + 1) = arg min
qi∈Ωi
Ci(qi) + qi
(
vi(t) − vnomi
)
. (5)
Notice that, in the decision problem (5), each node i takes the
feedback signal vi(t) as given, and is therefore considered as
being signal-taking. We thus call (4b) and (5) the signal-taking
voltage control.
We have the following results regarding the equilibrium and
dynamic properties of the signal-taking voltage control.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 in [3], [4]) Suppose Assumption 1
holds. Then there exists a unique equilibrium point. Moreover,
a point (v∗, q∗) is an equilibrium if and only if q∗ is the unique
optimal solution of the following global optimization problem:
min
q∈Ω
F(q) =
∑
i∈N
Ci(qi) +
1
2
q>Xq + q>∆v˜ (6)
with ∆v˜ := v˜ − vnom and v∗ = Xq∗ + v˜. 2
With v = Xq + v˜, the objective function F(q) can be
equivalently written as:
F(q) =
∑
i∈N
Ci(qi) +
1
2
(v − vnom)>X−1(v − vnom) − 1
2
∆v˜>X−1∆v˜,
where the last term is a constant. Therefore, the signal-taking
local voltage control (4a)–(4b) seeks an optimal trade-off
between minimizing the cost of reactive power provisioning∑
i∈N Ci(qi) and minimizing the cost of voltage deviation
1
2 (v − vnom)>X−1(v − vnom).
Theorem 2 (Corollary 1 in [4]) Suppose Assumptions 1 and
2 hold. If
σmax(AX) < 1, (7)
where A :=diag{αi}i∈N , then the signal-taking Volt/Var control
(4a)–(4b) converges to the unique equilibrium point (v∗, q∗).
Moreover, it converges exponentially fast to the equilibrium.2
Theorems 1-2 imply that the dynamical system (4a)-(4b) can
be seen as a distributed algorithm for solving the optimization
problem (6).
III. The Signal-Anticipating Voltage Control
As discussed in Section II, in the equivalent decision
problem (5), each node takes the feedback signal vi(t) as given,
making the local Volt/Var control (4b) a signal-taking control.
However, a node i may be able to learn or infer the impact
of its own decision qi on the feedback signal vi, i.e., node i
knows vi as a function of qi (see equation (2)), and takes it into
consideration when making the control decision on reactive
power, which we call the signal-anticipating voltage control.
With the signal-anticipating control, node i ∈ N will decide its
3
reactive power output according to the following optimization
problem:
qi(t + 1) = arg min
qi∈Ωi
Ci(qi) + qi(Xiiqi +
∑
j∈N\{i}
Xi jq j(t) + ∆v˜i). (8)
To see the difference from the signal-taking control, notice
that (5) can be written as:
qi(t + 1) = arg min
qi∈Ωi
Ci(qi) + qi
(∑
j∈N
Xi jq j(t) + ∆v˜i
)
. (9)
The signal-anticipating voltage control makes the interaction
among the nodes a game.
Definition 2 A voltage control game is defined as a triple
G = {N , (Ωi)i∈N , (hi)i∈N }, with a setN of players (nodes), node
i ∈ N strategy space Ωi, and cost function hi(q) = Ci(qi) +
qi(
∑
j∈N Xi jq j + ∆v˜i).
Let q−i = [q1, · · · , qi−1, qi+1, · · · , qN]> denote the reactive
powers at all nodes other than i, and represent q as [qi, q>−i]
>.
The signal-anticipating voltage control (8) can be written as
qi(t + 1) = arg min
qi∈Ωi
hi(qi, q−i(t)), i ∈ N , (10)
and is therefore the best response algorithm for the voltage
control game G [37].
Remark 1 The signal-anticipating control (8) can be rewrit-
ten as
qi(t + 1) = arg min
qi∈Ωi
Ci(qi) + qi(Xiiqi − Xiiqi(t) + vi(t) − vnomi ),
which can be computed using the current reactive power
provisioning qi(t) and the locally measured voltage vi(t) at
node i if Xii is known. Note that the voltage-to-power injection
sensitivity factor Xii =
∂vi
∂qi
, so it is reasonable to assume
node i can estimate it. Moreover, Xi j’s are physical parameters
of the distribution network. So, it is also reasonable for the
distribution system operator to estimate them and “inform”
the nodes. Therefore, the signal-anticipating control is a local
control like the signal-taking control.
A. Equilibrium
We now analyze the Nash equilibrium of the voltage control
game. A vector qa of reactive powers is a Nash equilibrium
if, for all nodes i ∈ N , hi(qai , qa−i) ≤ hi(qi, qa−i) for all qi ∈ Ωi.
We see that the Nash equilibrium is a set of reactive powers
for which no node has the incentive to change unilaterally.
Lemma 1 A Nash equilibrium qa of the voltage control game
G is a fixed point (or equilibrium) of the signal-anticipating
voltage control (8), and vice versa.
Proof: The result follows from the fact that the signal-
anticipating voltage control is the best response algorithm for
the voltage control game G; see equation (10).
Considering the function W : Ω→ R:
W(q) =
∑
i∈N
(
Ci(qi) +
1
2
Xiiq2i
)
+
1
2
q>Xq + q>∆v˜
and the global optimization problem:
min
q∈Ω
W(q). (11)
We have the following result on the relation between the
Nash equilibrium of voltage control game and the optimum of
problem (11).
Theorem 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists
a unique Nash equilibrium for the voltage control game G.
Moreover a point qa is a Nash equilibrium if and only if it is
the unique optimum of (11). 2
Proof: First, notice that the problem (11) is strictly
convex. So, the first order optimality condition for (11) is both
sufficient and necessary; and moreover, (11) has a unique op-
timum. Second, notice that the first order optimality condition
is just the fixed point condition of the best response algorithm
(10). The existence and uniqueness of the optimum of (11)
then implies that of the Nash equilibrium qa.
B. Dynamics
We now study the dynamic properties of the signal-
anticipating voltage control (8), i.e., the best response algo-
rithm (10).
Theorem 4 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If
σmax(BX¯) < 1, (12)
where B := diag{βi}i∈N with βi = 11/αi+2Xii and X¯ is the resulting
matrix by setting diagonal elements of X to 0, then the
signal-anticipating voltage control (8) converges to the unique
Nash equilibrium of the voltage control game G. Moreover, it
converges exponentially fast to the equilibrium. 2
Proof: Notice that the solution to (8) for each i ∈ N
satisfies the following equations:
q˜i(t + 1) = fi
(
2Xiiq˜i(t + 1) +
∑
j∈N\{i}
Xi jq j(t) + ∆v˜i
)
,
qi(t + 1) = [q˜i(t + 1)]Ωi ,
where the first equation is equivalent to
f −1i (q˜i(t + 1)) − 2Xiiq˜i(t + 1)︸                               ︷︷                               ︸
g−1i (q˜i(t+1))
=
∑
j∈N\{i}
Xi jq j(t) + ∆v˜i.
Here we define g−1i (x) := f
−1
i (x) − 2Xiix. Since g−1i is strictly
decreasing, its inverse gi exists. So, the signal-anticipating
control (8) can be written as:
qi(t + 1) =
[
gi
( ∑
j∈N\{i}
Xi jq j(t) + ∆v˜i
)]
Ωi
. (13)
Based on the definition of X¯, we rewrite (13) in the vector
form of
q(t + 1) =
[
g(X¯q(t) + ∆v˜)
]
Ω
, (14)
where g(x) := [g1(x1), · · · , gn(xn)]>.
Under Assumption 2, f
′
i ∈ [−αi, 0] in the appropriate
domain. Thus, ( f −1i )
′ ≤ − 1
αi
and (g−1i )
′ ≤ − 1
αi
−2Xii. Therefore,
4
gi has bounded gradient: g
′
i ∈ [− 11/αi+2Xii , 0] = [−βi, 0], by
definition of βi.
Although g is non-smooth at some points, we can show
that it is Lipschitz continuous, i.e., there exists a constant L
such that ‖g(x)− g(y)‖2 ≤ L‖x− y‖2,∀x, y. To see this, without
loss of generality, we assume xi ≥ yi. If both xi and yi are
in (−∞,− δi2 ] or in [ δi2 ,+∞), by the mean value theorem we
have |gi(xi) − gi(yi)| ≤ βi|xi − yi|. If both are in [− δi2 , δi2 ], we
have 0 = |gi(xi) − gi(yi)| ≤ βi|xi − yi|. If xi ∈ [ δi2 ,+∞) and
yi ∈ [− δi2 , δi2 ], |gi(xi) − gi(yi)| = |gi(xi) − gi( δi2 )| ≤ βi|xi − δi2 | ≤
βi|xi − yi|, where the first inequality follows from the mean
value theorem. Similarly, we can show that |gi(xi) − gi(yi)| ≤
βi|xi − yi| holds under other situations too. Therefore,
‖g(x) − g(y)‖2 ≤ ‖B(x − y)‖2 ≤ σmax(B)‖x − y‖2.
Based on (14) and the non-expansiveness property of pro-
jection operator, given any feasible q, q′, we can conclude∥∥∥∥[g(X¯q + ∆v˜)]
Ω
−
[
g(X¯q′ + ∆v˜)
]
Ω
∥∥∥∥
2
≤ ‖g(X¯q + ∆v˜) − g(X¯q′ + ∆v˜)‖2
≤ ‖BX¯(q − q′)‖2 ≤ σmax(BX¯)‖q − q′‖2.
If condition (12) is satisfied, the signal-anticipating control
(14) is a contraction mapping. This implies that q(t) (and
thus v(t)) converges exponentially fast to the unique Nash
equilibrium of the voltage control game G.
Recall that the signal-anticipating voltage control (8) is
the best response algorithm of the voltage control game. In
general, the best response is not a converging strategy, but that
is not case in our problem. On the other hand, the convergence
condition (12) is also expected: if the control is cautious
enough in adjusting reactive power (i.e., small enough αi),
it will converge. It also shows that if Xii is large enough, the
signal-anticipating control will converge too. This is consistent
with our intuition that the signal-anticipating behavior will
help with convergence, as each node adapts to the expected
voltage rather than the current voltage. Indeed, as will be seen
in the next subsection, the convergence condition (12) is less
restrictive than that for the signal-taking control.
Note that the convergence condition (12) requires calculat-
ing the maximum singular value of a matrix, which may not be
easy when the size of the network is large. We thus develop
a sufficient condition for (12), which is easier to verify in
practice.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. If
max
i∈N
βi ·max
i∈N
∑
j∈N
X¯i j < 1, (15)
then the signal-anticipating voltage control (8) converges ex-
ponentially fast to the unique Nash equilibrium of the voltage
control game G.
Proof: Based on Ho¨lder’s inequality for matrix norms,
we have
σmax(BX¯) = ‖BX¯‖2 ≤
√
‖BX¯‖1‖BX¯‖∞. (16)
A sufficient condition for (12) is given by ‖BX¯‖1 < 1 and
‖BX¯‖∞ < 1, which are satisfied if the condition (15) holds.
C. Comparison of Convergence Conditions
By taking into account the impact of its own decision,
the signal-anticipating voltage control adapts to the expected
voltage rather than the current voltage (that results from the
current reactive power provisioning), which expects to result
in better convergence property. This is indeed the case as can
be seen from the following result.
Theorem 5 The convergence condition (12) for the signal-
anticipating voltage control is less restrictive than the condi-
tion (7) for the signal-taking voltage control, i.e.,
σmax(BX¯) < σmax(AX). (17)
Proof: We prove Equation (17) in two steps. We first
show that σmax(BX) < σmax(AX). Recall thatA := diag{αi}i∈N
and B := diag{βi}i∈N with βi = 11/αi+2Xii . Define a matrix C =
diag{ei}i∈N with ei = 11+2Xiiαi , we have CA = B. Notice that
0 < ei < 1, so σmax(C) < 1. Therefore,
σmax(BX) = σmax(CAX) ≤ σmax(C)σmax(AX) < σmax(AX).
We next show that σmax(BX¯) < σmax(BX). Notice
that 0 ≺ (BX¯)>BX¯ ≺ (BX)>BX, where “≺” de-
notes the element-wise inequality. Thus, Frobenius norms
‖((BX¯)>BX¯)m‖F < ‖((BX)>BX)m‖F for m > 0, from which
we have ‖((BX¯)>BX¯)m‖1/mF < ‖((BX)>BX)m‖1/mF . By Gelfand’s
formula [38],
λmax((BX¯)>BX¯) = lim
m→∞ ‖((BX¯)
>BX¯)m‖1/mF
< lim
m→∞ ‖((BX)
>BX)m‖1/mF
= λmax((BX)>BX),
i.e., σmax(BX¯) < σmax(BX).
Combining the two steps above, we obtain σmax(BX¯) <
σmax(AX).
By (17), if the condition (7) holds, then the condition (12)
holds too. So, the signal-anticipating voltage control entails
better convergence property. For example, given the same
distribution network, it can converge under control functions
with larger slopes than the signal-taking control.
IV. The Price of Signal-Anticipation
The signal-taking and signal-anticipating behaviors in local
voltage control are analogous to the price-taking and price-
anticipating behaviors in economics. It is well-known that in
a competitive market with price-taking customers the system
achieves an efficient equilibrium and in an oligopolistic market
with price-anticipating (or strategic) customers the system
usually incurs efficiency loss; see, e.g., [5], [6]. Similarly, the
signal-taking behavior leads to an efficient equilibrium while
the signal-anticipating behavior may result in efficiency loss,
in term of the global cost function F(q). In this section, we
study such an efficiency loss.
5
A. Price of Signal Anticipation
We define price of signal anticipation (PoSA) to char-
acterize the impact of the signal anticipating behavior in
local voltage control in particular and in distributed control
in general.
Definition 3 The PoSA is defined as the gap in cost (or
efficiency loss) between the network equilibrium q∗ of the
dynamics (5) and the Nash equilibrium qa of the dynamics
(8), i.e.,
PoSA = F(qa) − F(q∗). (18)
We aim to investigate how PoSA scales with the size, topol-
ogy, and heterogeneity of the distribution network. Such results
will be insightful to understanding the signal-anticipating
behavior and designing mechanisms to mitigate its impact if
necessary.
In this paper, we will focus on a special case where each
node i ∈ N has a quadratic cost functions Ci(qi) = 12 yiq2i
with yi > 0. Quadratic cost functions are widely used in
market models for the power system. We further assume for
simplicity that there is no constraint in reactive power, i.e.,
qmini = −∞, qmaxi = ∞, i ∈ N . But the results are expected to
extend to more general settings.
Define the cost matrix Y = diag{yi}i∈N and denote by D the
diagonal part of X. The network equilibrium q∗ arising from
the signal-taking behavior solves
min
q
F(q) =
1
2
q>(X + Y)q + q>∆v˜, (19)
i.e., q∗ = −(X + Y)−1∆v˜; whereas the Nash equilibrium qa
arising from the signal-anticipating behavior solves
min
q
W(q) =
1
2
q>(X + D + Y)q + q>∆v˜, (20)
i.e., qa = −(X + D + Y)−1∆v˜.
Lemma 2 Given the reactance matrix X and the cost matrix
Y, the PoSA can be reformulated in a compact form as
PoSA = F(qa) − F(q∗) = 1
2
∆v˜>Π∆v˜, (21)
where Π = (X + D + Y)−1D(X + Y)−1D(X + D + Y)−1.
Proof: We have
F(qa) − F(q∗)
=
1
2
∆v˜>
(
(X + D + Y)−1(X + Y)(X + D + Y)−1− (X + D + Y)−1︸                                                                ︷︷                                                                ︸
(a)
+ (X + Y)−1 − (X + D + Y)−1︸                             ︷︷                             ︸
(b)
)
∆v˜. (22)
By the Woodbury’s formula [39],
(X+D+Y)−1 = (X+Y)−1−(X+Y)−1(D−1+(X+Y)−1)−1(X+Y)−1.
Substituting the above into (a) and (b), we obtain:
(a) = −(X + Y)−1(D−1 + (X + D + Y)−1)−1(X + D + Y)−1,
(b) = (X + D + Y)−1D(X + Y)−1.
Combining the above two equations, we have
(a) + (b) = (X + D + Y)−1 (D − (D−1 + (X + Y)−1)−1)︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
(c)
(X + Y)−1.
By the Woodbury’s formula, the second term in (c)
(D−1 + (X + Y)−1)−1 = D − D(X + D + Y)−1D,
so we have (c) = D(X + D + Y)−1D. Thus, we get
(a) + (b) = (X + D + Y)−1D(X + D + Y)−1D(X + Y)−1,
i.e., PoSA = 12 ∆v˜
>Π∆v˜.
Notice that Π  0, and thus PoSA is always positive for
nonzero ∆v˜ (which is actually the initial voltage deviation).
Since PoSA is quadratic in ∆v˜, without normalization PoSA
can be arbitrarily large. We therefore investigate a normalized,
worst-case PoSA with respect to the norm of ∆v˜, defined as:
PoSAmax(X,Y) = sup
∆v˜
PoSA
∆v˜>∆v˜
=
1
2
sup
∆v˜
∆v˜>Π∆v˜
∆v˜>∆v˜
. (23)
It follows that
PoSAmax(X,Y)=
1
2
λmax(Π), (24)
where λmax denotes the maximum eigenvalue, and can be
achieved by the eigenvector of Π corresponding to the maxi-
mum eigenvalue.
We will next characterize the PoSAmax. Before doing that,
first notice that, if there are multiple subtrees at node 0, the
voltage controls at these subtrees are independent as node 0
has a fixed voltage. Therefore, without loss of generality, for
the rest of the paper we consider the network where node 0
has only one direct child node.
Remark 2 We had originally considered F(q
a)−F(q?)
F(q?) or
F(qa)
F(q?)
as the metric of efficiency loss, but the specific structure of the
cost function in our problem does not allow a good analytical
characterization of them. The metrics of the ratio type such as
the price of anarchy was motivated by the competitive analysis
of approximation or online algorithms where competitive ratio
is used to characterize the performance of the algorithm.
An analytical characterization of the competitive ratio is
usually possible only if the problem has certain nice structure.
Besides the competitive ratio, another typical metric used
to characterize the performance of approximation or online
algorithms is regret that is the difference in the achieved cost
of the algorithm and certain optimal cost. Our definition of
the PoSA is a metric of the regret type.
B. Upper Bound on PoSAmax
We now characterize the PoSAmax by deriving an upper
bound for λmax(Π). Let d = maxi∈N Xii, y = mini∈N yi,
and λ, λmin denote an arbitrary and the minimum eigenvalue
respectively.
Lemma 3 An upper bound on eigenvalues of matrix D(X +
D + Y)−1 is given by:
λ(D(X + D + Y)−1) ≤ d
λmin(X) + d + y
. (25)
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Proof: By properties of matrix eigenvalue, we have
X + Y  (λmin(X) + y) I  (λmin(X) + y) Dd ,
where I denotes the identity matrix. Equivalently,
X + D + Y 
(
λmin(X) + y + d
d
)
D,
which leads to
D(X + D + Y)−1  d
λmin(X) + d + y
I.
By Lemma 3, we derive an upper bound on λmax(Π).
Theorem 6 The largest eigenvalue of Π is upper bounded by:
λmax(Π) ≤ λmax((X + Y)−1). (26)
That is, the PoSAmax is upper bounded by 12λmax((X + Y)
−1).
Proof: Notice that, given two matrices A and B, AB is
similar to BA and λ(AB) ≤ λ(A)λ(B) [40]. We thus have
λmax(Π) = λmax(D2(X + D + Y)−2(X + Y)−1)
≤ λmax(D2(X + D + Y)−2)λmax((X + Y)−1)
≤ d
2
(λmin(X) + d + y)2
λmax((X + Y)−1)
≤ λmax((X + Y)−1), (27)
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 3.
By [41], λmin(X) ≤ mini∈N Xii = X11. For a (large) tree
network with large depth, d = maxi∈N Xii scales linearly with
the depth of the tree, and thus d >> λmin(X) and d >> y. We
see that d
2
(λmin(X)+d+y)2
→ 1 for large networks.
Remark 3 By Weyl’s inequality [42], we have
λmax((X + Y)−1) =
1
λmin(X + Y)
≤ 1
λmin(X) + y
≤ 1
y
.
We see that the PoSAmax is upper bounded by a constant
independent of the size of the network, and the “average”
PoSAmax per node goes to zero as the size of the network
approaches to infinity. This is a desirable property as it states
that the PoSAmax will not be arbitrarily large, no matter what
the size of the network is.
C. Tightness of the Bound
We now investigate the tightness of the upper bound given
by Theorem 6 under different conditions. To that end, we
first give a lower bound on λmax(Π), and then numerically
investigate the tightness of the upper and lower bounds under
different network settings.
Theorem 7 The largest eigenvalue of Π is lower bounded by:
λmax(Π) ≥ λmax((X + Y)−1 − 2(X + Y + D)−1). (28)
Proof: Recall from equation (22) that Π is the sum of
two parts (a) and (b). By re-arranging the terms in these two
parts, we have
λmax(Π) = λmax((X + D + Y)−1(X + Y)(X + D + Y)−1︸                                          ︷︷                                          ︸
(d)
+ (X+Y)−1−2(X+D+Y)−1)
≥ λmin((d)) + λmax((X+Y)−1−2(X+D+Y)−1)
≥ λmax((X+Y)−1−2(X+D+Y)−1),
where the first inequality is due to Weyl’s inequality [42] and
the second inequality results from the fact that (d)  0.
By Theorems 6 and 7, we have
λmax((X + Y)−1− 2(X + Y + D)−1) ≤ λmax(Π) ≤ λmax((X + Y)−1).
By Weyl’s inequality, we have λmax(X +Y)−1−λmax((X +Y)−1−
2(X + Y + D)−1) ≤ 2λmax((X + D + Y)−1). So the gap between
the lower and upper bounds is bounded by 2λmax((X + D +
Y)−1). Although this bound on the gap can be large for general
matrix, due to the special structure of the reactance matrix X
our numerical experiments show that it is very small under
most of the settings (see below). This means that the upper
and lower bounds on the PoSAmax are tight.
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Fig. 2: Bounds on PoSAmax for linear network with xi j =
1, Y = I.
Fig. 2 shows the comparison between actual values and
lower/upper bounds of the PoSAmax for a homogeneous linear
network with different sizes. We see that the gap between the
lower and upper bounds approaches to 0 as the size of the
network increases. Fig. 3 shows the comparison for a het-
erogeneous linear network with randomly chosen parameters.
Again, we see the bounds on the PoSAmax are tight when the
size of the network is large.
We next evaluate the tightness of the bounds on random
trees. The random trees are generated according to the degree
distribution P in the number of children. For example, P =
{0.5, 0.5} means a node will have 0.5 probability of having one
child and 0.5 probability of having two children. Moreover,
the reactance of the power line and the cost coefficient of
the node are randomly chosen. Fig. 4 shows the bounds for a
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Fig. 3: Bounds on PoSAmax for linear network with randomly
chosen xi j ∈ (0, 200], yi ∈ (0, 100]. Each sample is repeated
10 times.
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Fig. 4: Bounds on PoSAmax for random tree with degree distri-
bution P = {0.5, 0.5} and randomly chosen xi j ∈ (0, 200], yi ∈
(0, 100]. Each sample is repeated 10 times.
random binary tree generated by distribution P = {0.5, 0.5} and
of up to the depth of 15 (totaling about 1400 nodes). Fig. 5
shows the bounds for a ternary tree generated by distribution
P = {0.3, 0.3, 0.4}. We see that the lower and upper bounds on
the PoSAmax are tight when the size of network is large, and
give a good approximation to the actual PoSAmax.
Notice that all our numerical experiments show that the
lower bound on the PoSAmax is tighter than the upper bound.
Nonetheless, we choose the upper bound instead of the lower
bound for analysis of PoSAmax for two reasons. First, we
consider the worst-case PoSAmax, so the upper bound is more
appropriate. Second, even though we do not have a closed
form for either bound, the upper bound is simpler to compute.
Moreover, as will be seen in the next subsection, we can derive
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Fig. 5: Bounds in PoSAmax for ternary tree with degree
distribution P = {0.3, 0.3, 0.4} and randomly chosen xi j ∈
(0, 200], yi ∈ (0, 100]. Each sample is repeated 10 times.
a closed form for the upper bound for linear networks.
D. Case Study: Linear Network
In this subsection, we investigate the PoSAmax for the linear
network as shown in Fig. 6.
Root 1 2 3 4 5 ....01 12 23 34 45
Fig. 6: Linear Network
For a linear network, the reactance matrix X is given by
X =

x0,1 · · · · · · x0,1
...
∑2
i=0 xi,i+1 · · ·
∑2
i=0 xi,i+1
...
...
. . .
...
x0,1
∑2
i=0 xi,i+1 · · ·
∑n−1
i=0 xi,i+1
 ,
where for clarity we write xi j as xi, j. By Lemma 6 in the
Appendix, X−1 is a symmetric tridiagonal matrix:
X−1 =

x0,1+x1,2
x0,1 x1,2
− 1x1,2 0 · · · · · ·
− 1x1,2
x1,2+x2,3
x1,2 x2,3
− 1x2,3 0 · · ·
0 − 1x2,3
x2,3+x3,4
x2,3 x3,4
− 1x3,4 0
... 0
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
... 0 − 1xn−1,n 1xn−1,n

.
We can have an analytical form for the eigenvalues of X when
all the xi,i+1 take the same value.
Lemma 4 If all the line reactances xi,i+1 take the same value,
denoted by a, the k-th largest eigenvalue λk of matrix X−1 is
given by
λk =
2
a
+
2
a
cos
2kpi
2n + 1
, k = 1, 2, · · · , n. (29)
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Proof: We have
X−1 =

2
a − 1a 0 · · · · · ·− 1a 2a − 1a 0 · · ·
0 − 1a 2a − 1a 0
... 0
. . .
. . . − 1a
...
... 0 − 1a 1a

.
By Theorem 1 of [43], X−1 has eigenvalues
λk =
2
a
+
2
a
cos
2kpi
2n + 1
, k = 1, 2, · · · , n.
The following result is immediate.
Theorem 8 For a linear network of size n with all the line
reactances equal to a, an upper bound of PoSAmax is given by
PoSAmax(X,Y) ≤ (an)
2(
a
2+2 cos 2pi2n+1
+ an + y
)2 (
y + a
2+2 cos 2pi2n+1
) .
Proof: By the inequality (26) and the fact that λmin(X +
Y) ≥ λmin(X) + y, we have
PoSAmax(X,Y) ≤ d
2
(λmin(X) + d + y)2(λmin(X) + y)
. (30)
By Lemma 4, λmin(X) = a2+2 cos 2pi2n+1
when k = 1. Substitute it
into (30) to get the result.
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Fig. 7: Upper bound on PoSAmax for linear network with xi j =
1, yi = 1 (left) and with xi j = 1 and randomly chosen yi ∈
[1, 1.5] (right).
Notice that, if the eigenvectors corresponding to the mini-
mum eigenvalues of X and Y are aligned, the bound given in
Theorem 8 will be tighter. This can happen when Y ≈ γI for
certain γ > 0, as shown in Fig. 7 (left). Otherwise, if the cost
coefficients yi of nodes span a large range, the corresponding
eigenvectors to the minimum eigenvalues will unlikely be
aligned and the bound will be less tight. This can be seen
from Fig. 7 (right) for a network with randomly chosen cost
coefficients.
Lemma 4 considers the special case with all line reactances
xi j taking the same value. We next consider a more general
setting with xi j ∈ [a, b] for certain b ≥ a > 0.
Lemma 5 If the line reactances xi j ∈ [a, b] in the linear
network, we can bound the k-th largest eigenvalue λk of X
as follows:
λlowerk ≤ λk ≤ λupperk , k = 1, · · · , n,
where
λlowerk =
a
2 + 2 cos 2(n−k+1)pi2n+1
and λupperk =
b
2 + 2 cos 2(n−k+1)pi2n+1
.
Proof: First, notice that for a linear network, if any of
the xi j increases, all eigenvalues of X will not decrease. To
see this, suppose that one xi j increases by . Then, the new
reactance matrix X′ can be written as
X′ = X +

0 · · · · · · · · ·
...
. . . · · · · · ·
...
...  
...
... 
. . .
︸                  ︷︷                  ︸
P
.
Notice that P is a positive semi-definite matrix, So, the eigen-
values of X′ will not be smaller than those of X, respectively.
If xi j randomly takes value in [a, b], denote by X(a) the
reactance matrix with all xi j = a and X(b) the matrix with all
xi j = b, we have the following inequality to lower and upper
bound k-th largest eigenvalue λk(X) with the corresponding
k-th largest eigenvalues of X(a) and X(b):
λi(X(a)) ≤ λi(X) ≤ λi(X(b)).
The result then follows from Lemma 4.
By Lemma 5, the following result is immediate.
Theorem 9 For a linear network with the line reactances xi j ∈
[a, b], the PoSAmax is bounded by
PoS Amax(X,Y) ≤ d
2
(λlowern + d + y)2(y + λlowern )
,
Similarly, the tightness of the above bound depends on the
heterogeneity of line reactances xi j and cost coefficient yi.
The above analytical and numerical results show that the
PoSAmax, i.e., the efficiency loss from the signal-anticipating
voltage control, is upper bounded by a constant, independent
of the size of the network, and the average PoSAmax per
node goes to zero as the size of the network increases.
This is desirable as it means that the PoSAmax will not be
arbitrarily large, no matter what the size of the network is,
and no mechanism is needed to mitigate the signal-anticipating
behavior.
Remark 4 if it happens that the efficiency loss of the signal-
anticipating control is large, under the engineering perspective
where the signal-anticipation comes from the limited/partial
information at individual nodes, the distribution system op-
erator may just tell each nodes to be signal-taking; and
under the economic perspective where the signal-anticipation
comes from the nodes being self-interested and strategic,
the distribution system operator may design proper incentive
mechanisms such as pricing to mitigate the impact of the
signal-anticipating behavior and to induce an efficient sys-
temwide outcome.
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Fig. 8: Circuit diagram for SCE distribution system.
V. Numerical Experiments with Real-world Circuit
In this section, we consider a 42-bus distribution feeder of
Southern California Edison (SCE) as shown in Fig. 8, to exam
numerically the efficiency loss and convergence of the signal-
anticipating voltage control.
As shown in Fig. 8, bus 1 is the substation (root bus) and
five PV generators are integrated at buses 2, 12, 26, 29 and
31. Table II describes the network data including the line
impedance, the peak MVA demand of loads, and the capacity
of the PV generators. As we aim to study the Volt/Var control
through the PV inverters, all shunt capacitors are assumed
to be off. We implement the piece-wise linear droop control
function of the IEEE 1547.8 Standard, with the same slope αi
and deadband [−δi/2, δi/2] at all inverters:
fi(vi) = −αi[vi − δi/2]+ + αi[−vi − δi/2]+. (31)
This corresponds to the following cost function in reactive
power provisioning:
Ci(qi) =
 yi2 q2i − δi2 qi, if qi ≤ 0,yi
2 q
2
i +
δi
2 qi, if qi ≥ 0,
(32)
where yi = 1/αi. All the experiments are run with a full AC
power flow model using MATPOWER [44] instead of its linear
approximation.
As we study a real-world distribution circuit, we cannot
scale it to different sizes as we do in Section IV. Instead,
we will consider different values of αi or equivalently yi. We
first exam the efficiency loss of the signal-anticipating voltage
control. Fig. 9 shows the PoSAmax value versus the yi value
with a deadband δi = 0.02 p.u. and capacity constraints of
the PVs. Fig. 10 shows the PoSAmax value versus the yi value
for an “ideal” situation with no deadband (i.e., δi = 0) or PV
capacity constraints. We see that the efficiency loss is very
small and decreases with increasing yi, as expected.
We next exam the dynamical property of the signal-
anticipating voltage control. Fig. 11 shows the evolution of
voltages for different αi values under the signal-taking and
signal-anticipating voltages controls with a deadband δi =
0.02 p.u. and PV capacity constraints. Fig. 12 shows that for
the controls without deadband or PV capacity constraints. As
shown in the subfigures (e)-(f), the signal-anticipating control
has less restrictive convergence condition than the signal-
taking control, which is consistent with the theoretical analysis
in Section III-C.
VI. Conclusion
We have considered the signal-anticipating behavior in
local voltage control for distribution systems, and shown that
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Fig. 9: Cost function values comparison and the price of
signal-anticipation with a deadband δi = 0.02 p.u. and PV
capacity constraints.
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Fig. 10: Cost function values comparison and the price of
signal-anticipation without deadband or PV capacity con-
straints.
the signal-anticipating voltage control is the best response
algorithm of a voltage control game. We characterize the
Nash equilibrium of the voltage control game and establish
its asymptotic global stability under the signal-anticipating
voltage control. We have further introduced the notion of Price
of Signal-Anticipation (PoSA) to characterize the impact of
signal-anticipating control, and characterized analytically and
numerically how the PoSA scales with the size, topology, and
heterogeneity of the network. Our results show that the PoSA
is upper bounded by a constant and the average PoSA per node
will go to zero as the size of the network increases. This is
desirable as it means that the PoSA will not be arbitrarily large,
no matter what the size of the network is, and no mechanism
is needed to mitigate the signal-anticipating behavior.
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Network Data
Line Data Line Data Line Data Load Data Load Data PV Generators
From To R X From To R X From To R X Bus Peak Bus Peak Bus Capacity
Bus. Bus. (Ω) (Ω) Bus. Bus. (Ω) (Ω) Bus. Bus. (Ω) (Ω) No. MVA No. MVA No. MW
1 2 0.259 0.808 8 34 0.244 0.046 18 19 0.198 0.046 11 0.67 28 0.27
2 3 0.031 0.092 8 36 0.107 0.031 22 26 0.046 0.015 12 0.45 29 0.2 2 1
3 4 0.046 0.092 8 30 0.076 0.015 22 23 0.107 0.031 13 0.89 31 0.27 26 2
3 13 0.092 0.031 8 9 0.031 0.031 23 24 0.107 0.031 15 0.07 33 0.45 29 1.8
3 14 0.214 0.046 9 10 0.015 0.015 24 25 0.061 0.015 16 0.67 34 1.34 31 2.5
4 17 0.336 0.061 9 37 0.153 0.046 27 28 0.046 0.015 18 0.45 35 0.13 12 3
4 5 0.107 0.183 10 11 0.107 0.076 28 29 0.031 0 19 1.23 36 0.67
5 21 0.061 0.015 10 41 0.229 0.122 30 31 0.076 0.015 20 0.45 37 0.13
5 6 0.015 0.031 11 42 0.031 0.015 30 32 0.076 0.046 21 0.2 39 0.45
6 22 0.168 0.061 11 12 0.076 0.046 30 33 0.107 0.015 23 0.13 40 0.2
6 7 0.031 0.046 14 16 0.046 0.015 37 38 0.061 0.015 24 0.13 41 0.45
7 27 0.076 0.015 14 15 0.107 0.015 38 39 0.061 0.015 25 0.2 Vbase = 12.35 KV
7 8 0.015 0.015 17 18 0.122 0.092 38 40 0.061 0.015 26 0.07 S base = 1000 KVA
8 35 0.046 0.015 17 20 0.214 0.046 27 0.13 Zbase = 152.52 Ω
TABLE II: Network Parameters of the SCE Circuit: Line impedances, peak spot load KVA, Capacitors and PV generation’s
nameplate ratings.
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(b) Signal-anticipating: αi = 9.
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(c) Signal-taking: αi = 18.
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(d) Signal-anticipating: αi = 18.
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(e) Signal-taking: αi = 27.
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(f) Signal-anticipating: αi = 27.
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Fig. 11: Convergence comparison between the signal-
anticipating and signal-taking voltage controls with a deadband
δi = 0.02p.u. and PV capacity constraints.
References
[1] J. Shihadeh, S. You, and L. Chen, “Signal-anticipating in local voltage
control in distribution systems,” Proc. of IEEE SmartGridComm Con-
ference, pp. 212–217, October 2014.
[2] I. P1547, “Recommended practice for establishing methods and proce-
dures that provide supplemental support for implementation strategies
for expanded use of ieee standard 1547,” Draft D4.0, December 2012.
[3] M. Farivar, L. Chen, and S. Low, “Equilibrium and dynamics of local
(a) Signal-taking: αi = 9.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.95
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
0.98
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
(b) Signal-anticipating: αi = 9.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.95
0.955
0.96
0.965
0.97
0.975
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
(c) Signal-taking: αi = 18.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
(d) Signal-anticipating: αi = 18.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
(e) Signal-taking: αi = 27.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
(f) Signal-anticipating: αi = 27.
10 20 30 40 50
Number of Iterations
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
Vo
lta
ge
 V
al
ue
s
Bus 2
Bus 12
Bus 26
Bus 29
Bus 31
Fig. 12: Convergence comparison between the signal-
anticipating and signal-taking voltage controls without dead-
band or PV capacity constraints.
voltage control in distribution systems,” Proc. of IEEE Conference on
Decision and Control (CDC), 2013.
[4] X. Zhou, M. Farivar, Z. Liu, L. Chen, and S. Low, “Reverse and forward
engineering of local voltage control in distribution networks,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1801.02015, 2018.
[5] A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston, and J. Green, Microeconomic Theory.
Oxford, 1995.
[6] N. Noam, R. Tim, T. Eva, and V. Vijay, Algorithmic game theory.
Cambridge University Press Cambridge, 2007, vol. 1.
11
[7] M. Baran and F. Wu, “Optimal capacitor placement on radial distribution
systems,” IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 725–734,
1989.
[8] ——, “Optimal sizing of capacitors placed on a radial distribution
system,” IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 735–743,
1989.
[9] H.-D. Chiang and M. Baran, “On the existence and uniqueness of load
flow solution for radial distribution power networks,” IEEE Trans. on
Circuits and Systems, vol. 37, no. 3, pp. 410–416, 1990.
[10] K. Turitsyn, P. Su˘lc, S. Backhaus, and M. Chertkov, “Options for control
of reactive power by distributed photovoltaic generators,” Proc. of IEEE,
vol. 99, no. 6, pp. 1063 –1073, 2011.
[11] J. Smith, W. Sunderman, R. Dugan, and B. Seal, “Smart inverter volt/var
control functions for high penetration of PV on distribution systems,”
Proc. of IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition (PSCE),
2011.
[12] J. Simpson-Porco, F. Dorfler, F. Bullo et al., “Voltage stabilization in
microgrids via quadratic droop control,” IEEE Trans. on Automatic
Control, vol. 62, no. 3, pp. 1239–1253, 2017.
[13] H. Zhu and H. J. Liu, “Fast local voltage control under limited
reactive power: Optimality and stability analysis,” IEEE Trans. on Power
Systems, vol. 31, no. 5, pp. 3794–3803, 2016.
[14] P. Sˇulc, S. Backhaus, and M. Chertkov, “Optimal distributed control of
reactive power via the alternating direction method of multipliers,” IEEE
Trans. on Energy Conversion, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 968–977, 2014.
[15] X. Zhou, E. Dall’Anese, L. Chen, and A. Simonetto, “An Incentive-
based Online Optimization Framework for Distribution Grids,” IEEE
Trans. on Automatic Control, vol. 63, no. 7, pp. 2019 – 2031, 2017.
[16] X. Zhou, Z. Liu, E. Dall’Anese, and L. Chen, “Stochastic Dual Al-
gorithm for Voltage Regulation in Distribution Networks with Discrete
Loads,” Proc. of IEEE SmartGridComm Conference, pp. 405–410, 2017.
[17] N. Li, G. Qu, and M. Dahleh, “Real-time decentralized voltage control
in distribution networks,” Proc. of Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing, pp. 582–588, 2014.
[18] X. Zhou, Z. Liu, W. Wang, C. Zhao, F. Ding, and L. Chen, “Hierarchical
distributed voltage regulation in networked autonomous grids,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1809.08624, 2018.
[19] M. Farivar, C. Clarke, S. Low, and K. Chandy, “Inverter var control for
distribution systems with renewables,” Proc. of IEEE SmartGridComm
Conference, 2011.
[20] E. Dall’Anese, S. V. Dhople, and G. B. Giannakis, “Optimal dispatch of
photovoltaic inverters in residential distribution systems,” IEEE Trans.
on Sustainable Energy, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 487–497, 2014.
[21] V. Kekatos, G. Wang, A. J. Conejo, and G. B. Giannakis, “Stochastic
reactive power management in microgrids with renewables,” IEEE Trans.
on Power Systems, vol. 30, no. 6, pp. 3386–3395, 2015.
[22] M. Ilic-Spong, J. Christensen, and K. Eichorn, “Secondary voltage
control using pilot point information,” IEEE Trans. on Power Systems,
vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 660–668, 1988.
[23] N. Fledman, K. Lai, and L. Zhang, “A price-anticipating resource
allocation mechanism for distributed shared clusters,” Proc. of ACM
Conference on Electronic Eommerce, pp. 127–136, 2005.
[24] R. Johari and J. Tsitsiklis, “A scalable network resource allocation
mechanism with bounded efficiency loss,” IEEE Journal on Selected
Areas in Communications, vol. 24, no. 5, pp. 992–999, 2006.
[25] L. Chen, L. Na, S. Low, and J. Doyle, “Two market models for
demand response in power networks,” Proc. of IEEE SmartGridComm
Conference, pp. 397–402, 2010.
[26] P. Samadi, H. Mohsenian-Rad, R. Schober, and W. Vincent, “Advanced
demand side management for the future smart grid using mechanism
design,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 1170–1180, 2012.
[27] N. Li, L. Chen, and M. Dahleh, “Demand response using linear supply
function bidding,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 1827–
1838, 2015.
[28] Z. Fan, “A distributed demand response algorithm and its application to
phev charging in smart grids,” IEEE Trans. on Smart Grid, vol. 3, no. 3,
pp. 1280–1290, 2012.
[29] R. Johari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Efficiency loss in a network resource
allocation game,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 29, no. 3,
pp. 407–435, 2004.
[30] T. Wu and D. Starobinski, “On the price of anarchy in unbounded delay
networks,” Proc. of the Workshop on Game Theory for Communications
and Networks, p. 13, 2006.
[31] M. Haviv and T. Roughgarden, “The price of anarchy in an exponential
multi-server,” Operations Research Letters, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 421–426,
2007.
[32] H.-L. Chen, J. R. Marden, and A. Wierman, “On the impact of
heterogeneity and back-end scheduling in load balancing designs,” Proc.
of INFOCOM, pp. 2267–2275, 2009.
[33] R. Johari and J. N. Tsitsiklis, “Parameterized supply function bidding:
Equilibrium and efficiency,” Operations Research, vol. 59, no. 5, pp.
1079–1089, 2011.
[34] E. Altman, U. Ayesta, and B. J. Prabhu, “Load balancing in processor
sharing systems,” Telecommunication Systems, vol. 47, no. 1-2, pp. 35–
48, 2011.
[35] L. Chen and N. Li, “On the interaction between load balancing and
speed scaling,” IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
vol. 33, no. 12, pp. 2567–2578, 2015.
[36] M. Baran and F. Wu, “Network reconfiguration in distribution systems
for loss reduction and load balancing,” IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery,
vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 1401–1407, 1989.
[37] D. Fudenburg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. The MIT Press, 1991.
[38] M. Reed, Methods of modern mathematical physics: Functional analysis.
Elsevier, 2012.
[39] G. Golub and C. V. Loan, Matrix Computations. JHU Press, 2012,
vol. 3.
[40] R. Horn and C. Johnson, Matrix Analysis. Cambridge University Press,
2012.
[41] H. Alfred, “Doubly stochastic matrices and the diagonal of a rotation
matrix,” American Journal of Mathematics, vol. 76, no. 3, pp. 620–630,
1954.
[42] H. Weyl, “Das asymptotische verteilungsgesetz der eigenwerte linearer
partieller differentialgleichungen (mit einer anwendung auf die theorie
der hohlraumstrahlung),” Mathematische Annalen, vol. 71, no. 4, pp.
441–479, 1912.
[43] Y. Wen-Chyuan, “Eigenvalues of several tridiagonal matrices,” Applied
Mathematics E-Notes, vol. 5, no. 66-74, pp. 210–230, 2005.
[44] R. D. Zimmerman, C. E. Murillo-Sa´nchez, and R. J. Thomas, “Mat-
power: Steady-state operations, planning, and analysis tools for power
systems research and education,” IEEE Trans. on power systems, vol. 26,
no. 1, pp. 12–19, 2011.
Appendix
Properties of Reactance Matrix X
One interesting and important property of X is that its
inverse X−1 has an analytical form which is strongly related
to the Laplacian matrix of the inverse tree defined next.
Definition 4 (Inverse Tree) Given the tree graph T = {N ∪
{0},L} with node 0 (root node) being of degree 1, the inverse
tree T ′ is defined as follows:
a. T ′ and T have the same topology, i.e., the same sets of
vertices and lines.
b. For each line (i, j) ∈ L of T ′, its link weight is x′i j = 1xi j .
See Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 for an illustrative example for inverse
tree.
0 (Root)
1
2
3
c
b
4
d
a
Fig. 13: The original
tree T .
0 (Root)
1
2
3
1/c
1/b
4
1/d
1/a
Fig. 14: The inverse
tree T ′.
Denote by L ∈ Rn×n the weighted Laplacian matrix for
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inverse tree T ′ excluding the root node, defined as follows
Li j =

−1/xi j, (i, j) ∈ L, i , j∑
(i,k)∈L 1/xik, i = j
0, otherwise
.
Index by 1 the direct child node of node 0 and denote by a the
weight of link (0, 1). We have the following result that gives
an explicit form of X−1.
Lemma 6 For any tree T , the inverse X−1 of the reactance
matrix X has the following explicit form:
X−1 = L +

1/a 0 · · ·
0 0 · · ·
...
...
. . .
 . (33)
Proof: Before proving the result, notice that the reactance
matrix, its inverse, and the weighted Laplacian matrix are for
the tree and the inverse tree excluding the root node (node
0), even though they contain information about the root node.
Accordingly, denote by Ni, Ci and hi the set of neighbor nodes,
the set of child nodes and the parent node of node i ∈ N in
the tree T (and the inverse tree T ′ ) excluding the root node.
Notice that
(X−1)i j =

1/a +
∑
k∈C1 1/(Xkk − X11), if i = j = 1,
1/(Xii − Xhihi ) +
∑
k∈Ci 1/(Xkk − Xii), if i = j , 1,
−1/|Xii − X j j|, if j ∈ Ni,
0, otherwise.
To prove (33), it is equivalent to show (XX−1)i j = δi j, where
δi j is the Kronecker delta. We first analyze (XX−1)ii. When
i , 1,
(XX−1)ii =
∑
k
Xik(X−1)ki
= Xii(X−1)ii +
∑
k∈Ni
Xik(X−1)ki
= Xii(X−1)ii +
Xhihi
Xhihi − Xii
+
∑
k∈Ci
Xii
Xii − Xkk
= 1.
When i = 1,
(XX−1)11 = X11(X−1)11 +
∑
k∈C1
X11
X11 − Xkk = a
1
a
= 1.
Similarly, for (XX−1)i j with i , j, we have
(XX−1)i j =
Xi j − Xih j
X j j − Xh jh j
+
∑
k∈C j
Xi j − Xik
Xkk − X j j .
Consider the overlap Li ∩L j between the paths from the root
node to nodes i and j. We have two cases:
• If Li ∩ L j ⊆ Lh j , then Xi j = Xik for k ∈ N j and thus
(XX−1)i j = 0.
• Otherwise, L j ⊂ Li and there exits a node c j ∈ C j such
that Lc j ⊆ Li. We then have Xi j = X j j, Xih j = Xh jh j ,
Xic j = Xc jc j and Xik = X j j for k ∈ C j\{c j}. Applying these
relations, we have (XX−1)i j = 0.
As an illustrative example, we calculate X−1 based on
Fig. 13 and 14. The reactance matrix X for the original tree
in Fig. 13 is
X =

a a a a
a a + b a + b a
a a + b a + b + c a
a a a a + d
 .
Based on the corresponding inverse tree in Fig. 14, the
weighted Laplacian matrix L of T ′ excluding node 0 is
L =

(b + d)/bd −1/b 0 −1/d
−1/b (b + c)/bc −1/c 0
0 −1/c 1/c 0
−1/d 0 0 1/d
 .
By Lemma 6, we have
X−1 =

(b+d)/bd+1/a −1/b 0 −1/d
−1/b (b + c)/bc −1/c 0
0 −1/c 1/c 0
−1/d 0 0 1/d
 .
As can be seen from Lemma 6 and the above example, the
inverse matrix X−1 reveals the topology information of power
network (through the Laplacian matrix L).
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